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Shannon’s notion of relative information between two physical systems can function as foundation
for statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, without referring to subjectivism or idealism. It
can also represent a key missing element in the foundation of the naturalistic picture of the world,
providing the conceptual tool for dealing with its apparent limitations. I comment on the relation
between these ideas and Democritus.
I. IS THERE A SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT IN
STATISTICAL MECHANICS?
Thermodynamical quantities such as entropy and tem-
perature depend on the macroscopical variables chosen
to describe systems with many degrees of freedom. They
depend on coarse-graining. For instance, entropy can be
defined (in the microcanonical) in terms of the the num-
ber of microstates compatible with what we know about
the system. With this definition, it changes if we know
more. This appears to insert a puzzling subjective ele-
ment in physics. There is a tension with the fact that
termodynamical laws seem to hold quite independently
on any choice by us. Is the Sun “hot” just because we
“choose” a certain coarse graining for describing it? Does
entropy increases because of our choices?
The way out of the puzzle is simple. Entropy is nei-
ther something inherent to the microstate of a system,
nor something depending on our subjective “knowledge”
about it. Rather, it is a property of certain (macroscopic)
variables. For instance, the full state of a gas in a box
is described by the position and velocity of its molecules.
No entropy so far. But volume, total energy and (time
averaged) pressure on the box boundaries are well de-
fined functions of this state, and Entropy is a function of
these. This is the first step.
Now consider a situation where the gas interacts with a
second system coupled only to volume, total energy and
pressure of the gas (for instance, it interacts with the gas
by a thermometer and a spring holding a piston). Then
the physical interactions between the gas and this system
are objectively described by thermodynamics.
In other words, it is not an arbitrary or subjective
choice of a coarse-graining that makes thermodynamics
physically relevant: it is the concrete way another phys-
ical system is coupled to the gas. If the coupling is such
that it depends only on certain gas macroscopic variables,
then the physical interactions of the gas and this system
are objectively well governed by thermodynamics.
This key observation clarifies the role that informa-
tion plays in physics. Entropy, indeed, is information:
in the micro-canonical language entropy is determined
by the number of microstates compatible with a given
macrostate. The number of states in which something
can be, is precisely the definition of “information” (more
precisely, “lack of information”) given by Shannon in his
celebrated 1948 work that started the development of
information theory [1]. But “information”, that is, the
number of alternatives compatible with what we know,
is not significative in physics insofar as it depends on
idealistic subjective knowledge: it is relevant in physics
when it refers to the interaction between two systems
where the effects of the interaction on the second depend
only on few variables of the first, and are independent on
the rest of the variables. Under these circumstances, the
number of states of the first system which are not dis-
tinguished by these variables is the number of Shannon
“alternatives”, relevant for the definition of thermody-
namical entropy. Here “information”, counts the num-
ber of states of a system which behave equally in the
interaction with a second system.
Therefore the information relevant in physics is always
the relative information between two systems. There is
no subjective element in it: it is fully determined by
the state and the interaction Hamiltonian which dictates
which variables are the relevant ones in the interaction.
Pictorially: it is not the microstate of the Sun which
is hot, it is the manner the Sun affects the Earth which
is objectively hot.
II. RELATIVE IRREVERSIBILITY
Reconsider the quintessential irreversible phenomenon:
a cup falls to the floor and breaks, in the light of the ob-
servation above. On one account this is obviously an
irreversible phenomenon, but is it so on any possible ac-
count? The event is one among the many possible dy-
namical evolutions of a bunch of molecules. What makes
the starting configuration more “special” that the final
one? Something does so, but it is not in the microstate of
the molecules: it is the manner we describe, or better, at
the light of the previous section, we interact with it. It is
because of our macroscopic account of the cup, dictated
by the variables we interact with, that the initial state is
special and therefore entropy increases.
To illustrate this, consider a box full of balls, charac-
terized by two properties, say color and electrical charge.
Say they have two possible colors: white and black; and
two possible value of the charge: neutral and charged.
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Consider a microstate Col where white balls are on the
left of the box and black balls on the right, while charge
is randomly distributed. And consider a different mi-
crostate Ch, where charged balls are on the left and
neutral balls on the right, while color is randomly dis-
tributed. To normal eyes, Col looks as a low-entropy
state and Ch as a high entropy state. But to a per-
son who is color blind but has an electrometer it us Ch
that looks low-entropy and Col that appears to have high
entropy. Who is right? Both, of course. Entropy is rela-
tional: it pertain to the relation between two interacting
systems, not to a single system.
Could the breaking cup be observed by somebody else,
coupling differently to it, as a process where entropy de-
creases? Yes of course. Imagine each fragment of the cup
moving to a picture of itself on the ground, pictured in
color to which you are color blind.
If these considerations are correct, then the irreversibil-
ity of the worlds is to be understood as a property of the
couplings between systems, rather than a property of iso-
lated systems.
III. THE LIMITS OF MICROPHYSCS
WITHOUT INFORMATION
The idea that the world can be described as a vast see
of interacting atoms and nothing else, can be traced back
to the ancient atomism of Democritus. The naturalistic
and materialistic world view of Democritus was soon crit-
icized by Plato and Aristotle on the ground that it fails to
account for the forms, or the objects, that we see in the
world. What makes a certain ensemble of atoms into a
given object we recognize? Plato and Aristotle (in differ-
ent manners) wanted to add “forms” to the naturalistic
view of Democritus. For Plato, a horse is not just an
aggregate of matter: it is an imprecise realization of the
abstract form (“idea”) of a horse. For Aristotle the same
horse is the union of its substance and its form. But if
the form is something above the substance, what is it?
What is it that makes a random disposition of
molecules into a cup? Which the properties of the Dem-
ocritean atoms generate collective variables? And how?
In fact, Democritus’s idea was more subtle than ev-
erything being just atoms. Democritus says that three
features are relevant about the atoms: the shape of each
individual atom, the order in which they are disposed,
and their orientation in the structure. And Democritus
uses then a powerful metaphor: like twenty letters of an
alphabet can be combined in innumerable manners to
give rise to comedies or tragedies, similarly the atoms
can be combined in innumerable manners to give rise to
the innumerable phenomena of the world.
But what is the relevance of the way in which atoms
combine, in a world in which there is nothing else than
atoms? If they are like letters of an alphabet, whom do
they tell stories to?
I think that the key of the answer brings us back to the
observation in the first section: physical systems interact
and affect one another. In the course of these interac-
tions, the way one happens to be, leaves traces on the
way another is: correlations are established.
Following Shannon, we can say that a system s has
information about a system S if there is a physical con-
straint such that the number of total states of the two
systems is smaller than the product of the number of
states of each. For instance: if the system s can be in
the states a and b and the system S can be in the states
A and B, but there is a physical constraint (say do to
the way the two have interacted) that forbids the com-
binations (a,B) and (b, A), thus allowing only the two
states (a,A) and (b, B), then we say that s has (one bit
of) information about S. In words, if we see the state
of s, we also know the state of S. Physical interactions
determine constraints among systems: if a tree happen
to fall on my head, then I cannot be standing smiling
anymore: I have some information about the tree.
Thus, systems have necessarily information about one
another, in the sense of Shannon. The lack of information
that a system has about another is precisely the entropy
of the second with respect to the first. It is relevant
for the interactions with the first. It is the conventional
thermodynamical entropy.
Before pursuing this line of thinking, let me bring
quantum theory into the picture.
IV. QUANTUM THEORY
The discovery of quantum theory has sharpened the
role of information in our understanding of the world. If
we measure the state of a system with a certain precision,
the resulting information specifies a region R of the phase
space of the system. The unit of phase space volume is
action (length2 x mass x time−1) per degree of freedom.
In classical mechanics we can in principle arbitrarily re-
fine measurements, therefore there is always a continuous
(infinite) amount of missing information about a system,
whatever the precision of the measurement.
No longer so after the discovery of quantum theory. If
we measure the energy of a harmonic oscillator and we
obtain the result that this is between E1 and E2, then
there is only a finite number of possible values that the
energy can have. This is given by the area of the region
of phase space included between the two surfaces E1 and
E2, divided by the Planck constant.
This is a general result: for all quantum systems, there
is only a finite number of the orthogonal states per each
finite region of phase space. The Planck constant deter-
mines the minimal phase space volume. Phase space vol-
ume measures the (missing) information we have about a
system. It follows that quantum mechanics affirms that
information is no longer continuous as in classical physics.
It is discrete, and the Planck constant is the minimal unit
of information.
This leads to a first principle at the basis of quantum
2
theory: The information contained in any finite region
of the phase space of any system is finite.
This principle does not exhaust quantum theory, be-
cause it holds for any discrete classical system as well.
What further characterises quantum theory is that in-
formation can become “irrelevant”, and be renewed. By
this I mean the following. If we have measured a system,
the information we have about it allows us to predict
its future. In quantum theory, we can always add new
information to the state of a system, even after we have
reached maximal information about it. By doing so, part
of the old information becomes irrelevant. That is, is has
no effect on future predictions. The typical case is a
sequence of measurements of spins along different axes,
in a two-state system. Each measurement brings novel
information and makes the previous one irrelevant.
This leads to the second principle at the basis of quan-
tum theory: It is always possible to acquire new informa-
tion about a system.
The combination of these two principles generates the
entire mathematical structure of quantum theory, up to
some technical aspects, as was shown in [2]. Thus, rela-
tive information that systems have about one another is
a key language for grounding quantum theory.
Let us now remember that spacetime geometry is dy-
namical. Then any physical system must include the its
spacetime region. This implies that there is natural iden-
tification between systems and spacetime regions. The
interactions between spacetime regions are quantum in-
teractions between systems. Therefore there is an ex-
change of informations across spacial regions. These are
quantized and discrete, because information is discrete.
The quantum discreetness, combined to the fact that ge-
ometry is dynamical and therefore quantized, leads to
the discretization of space, idea that can be traced back
to the thirties [3, 4] and has been concretized more re-
cently. Discreetness translates into the discreetness of the
area of two-dimensional surfaces [5, 6]. The discreteness
of the area is an immediate reflex of the discreetness of
the quantum information that can be transmitted across
these surfaces.
V. REALITY AND INFORMATION
It seems to me that this ensemble of considerations
conspire towards a picture where the fog begins a bit to
dissipate over the intriguing role of information at the
foundation of physics.
Information that physical systems have about one an-
other, in the sense of Shannon, is ubiquitous in the uni-
verse. It has the consequence that on top of the mi-
crostate of a system we have also the informational state
that a second system O has about any system S.
The universe is not just the position of all its Dem-
ocritean atoms. It is also the net of information that all
systems have about one another. Objects are not just
aggregate of atoms. They are configurations of atoms
singled out because of the manner a given other system
interacts with them. An object is only such with respect
to an observer interacting with it.
Among all systems, living ones are those that selec-
tion has led to persist and reproduce by, in particular,
making use of the information they have about the ex-
terior world. This is why we can understand them in
terms of finality and intentionality. They are those that
have persisted thanks to the finality in their structure.
Thus, it is not finality that drives structure, but selected
structures define finality. Since the interaction with the
world is described by information, it is by dealing with
information that these systems most effectively persist.
This is why we have DNA code, immune systems, sen-
sory organs, neural systems, memory, complex brains,
language, books, MAC’s and the ArXives. To maximize
the management of information.
The statue that Aristotle wants made of more than
atoms, is made by more than atoms: it is something that
pertains to the interaction between the stone and brain
of Aristotle, or ours. It is something that pertains to
the stone, the goddess represented, Phidias, a woman he
met, our education, and else. The atoms of that statue
talk to us precisely in the same manner in which a white
ball in my hand “says” that the ball in your hand is also
white, if the two are correlated. By carrying information.
This is why, I think, from the basis of genetics, to the
foundation of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics,
all the way to sociology and quantum gravity, the notion
of information has a pervasive and unifying role. The
world is not just a blind wind of atoms, or general covari-
ant quantum fields. It is also the infinite game of mirrors
reflecting one another formed the correlations among the
structures made by the elementary objects. To go back to
Democritus metaphor: atoms are like an alphabet, but
an immense alphabet so rich to be capable of reading
itself and thinking itself. In Democritus words:
“The Universe is change, life is opinion that adapt it-
self”.
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